To investigate the format of mental images and the penetrability of mental imagery performance to top-down influences in the form of gravity information, children (4-, 6-, 8-and 10-year-olds) and adults (N = 112) performed mental rotation tasks. A linear increase in response time with rotation angle emerged at 6-years, suggesting that spatial properties are represented in children's mental images. Moreover, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, but not 4-yearolds or adults, took longer to respond to rotated stimuli pairs when gravity information was incongruent with the direction of rotation rather than congruent. Overall, findings suggest that in contrast to adults', 6-to 10-year-olds' mental rotation performance was penetrated by topdown information. This research a) provides insight into the format of young children's mental images and b) shows that children's mental imagery rotation performance is penetrable by top-down influences.
Research with adults in mental imagery over the last 30 years has revealed that our images are depictive representations that preserve metric qualities such as space and distance (e.g., Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2003) .
Support for this depictive account comes from mental rotation tasks, whereby participants judge whether pairs of objects are the same or mirror images of one another when one of the pair is rotated to different degrees. A key finding is that response times increase linearly with increasing difference in rotation angle between objects (Shepard & Metzler, 1971 ). Such findings demonstrate that mental images incorporate the spatial information present in the original object; whole patterns are mentally rotated until aligned in orientation of the other object, and patterns possess a structure similar to representations that arise from perception (Kosslyn et al., 2003) . This linear increase in rotation time with angle is already evident in 5-and 6-year-old children (Estes, 1998; Frick, Daum, Walser, & Mast, 2009; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990; Marmor, 1975) , indicating a depictive format of children's mental images.
However, it has also been shown that mental images are susceptible to top-down influences, and are thus cognitively penetrable: visual perceptual and mental experiences can vary as a function of participants' beliefs, expectations, and knowledge (Pylyshyn, 2002; Kosslyn et al., 2003) . In visual perception, adults and children are more likely to perceive alternative interpretations of ambiguous figures when they have knowledge of ambiguity (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Gregory, 2009; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011) . Similarly, in mental imagery adults can reverse between alternative interpretations of ambiguous figures when cues are provided (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992 ). Thus, evidence shows that adults' mental images are depictive in format (Kosslyn et al., 2003) but also cognitively penetrable by top-down information (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, et al., 1992) . However a fundamental question remains whether the mental depiction of visual To date, there is evidence of penetrability of mental rotation processes by motor processes in children and adults. Specifically, both children and adults take longer to mentally rotate kinetic stimuli when they arethat when they incongruentin interferenceincongruent with motoric components ((such as incongruent hand movements)) compared to when they arecompared to when they are versus congruent ones (Funk, Brugger, & Wilkening, 2005; Ionta, Fourkas, Fiorio, & Aglioti, 2007; Parsons, 1994) . SpecificallyT, hese types of mental rotation processes become increasingly differentiated from motor processes with increasing age (Frick et al., 2009; Funk, Brugger, & Wilkeninget al., 2005) . In contrast to 11-year-olds and adults, 5-and 8-year-olds are faster at responding to rotated stimuli when a manual rotation of their hands is in line with the stimulus rotation direction, rather than in reverse (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005) . These Thus, findings indicate that young children's but not adults' kinetic mental rotation processes are guided to a larger extent by motor processes than adults (see. Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998 for neuroimaging evidence supporting the role of motor processes in kinetic rotation in adults). Together with findings that children's visual perceptual processes are penetrated by top-down influences (Wimmer & Doherty, 2011) , one would predict that children's mental rotation processes may also be influenced by top-down processes and possibly to a larger extent than adults' (Funk et al., 2005) . (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005 ) reflects development of imagery processes per se, then one would also predict less top-down influence on mental rotation processes with increasing age.
To manipulate top-down conceptual information, we used stimuli of a monkey standing on a table with one leg that was shorter than the other, suggesting that table and monkey would fall in the direction towards the shorter leg. This was either congruent or incongruent with the direction of the rotated stimulus. Using this top-down information required basic knowledge of gravity. Previous work has shown that 4-year-olds are around 90% and 60% correct at judging from photographs whether an abstract symmetrical/ asymmetrical (respectively) object would fall off a partially supporting block (Krist, 2010) ; that children as young as 3 years of age are sensitive to gravity (Kim & Spelke, 1999) ; and 41/2-months-olds have "intuition" about physical support (Needham & Baillargeon, 1993) .
Thus, the present task should pose no difficulties in conceptual understanding for 4-year-olds.
Nevertheless, we checked children's understanding at the end of the task. recruited from the university's online participation system and participated for course credit.
Materials and procedure
Participants were seen in a quiet area outside the classroom (children) or at the university laboratory (adults). Tasks were computerized and presented on a 17.3 inch laptop PC running with the program Visual Basic that recorded the two dependent measures: (i) correctness and (ii) time taken to respond (reaction time from stimulus onset to button press).
The images used throughout were taken from the monkey pairs from Estes (1998) which were adapted by adding extra stimuli. Participants' task was to judge whether two monkeys appearing next to each other held up the same or different arms. The monkey on the left hand side was always upright and stood on a table with one leg cut off (see Figure 1 ).
There were two different table versions: Either the monkey looked likely to fall to the right (congruent: towards the rotated monkey on the right hand side) or the monkey looked likely to fall to the left (incongruent: away from the rotated monkey on the right hand side). The monkey on the right hand side was shown in 7 different rotation angles, from 0° to 180° at 30° increments. Both stimuli remained in view, so no memory assessment or control condition was required.
( Children were shown half the stimuli (28) The task was to judge whether monkeys held up the same or different arms.
Participants received four practice trials, containing first one "same" and one "different" monkey-pair (without the table) at 0˚ and then one "same" and one "different" pair at 30˚.
Practice was repeated if participants did not understand the task or answered more than one trial incorrectly. After a maximum of two repetitions all participants answered all practice trials correctly. In the test trials adults pressed the 'S' for same and 'D' for different keys, indicating whether the monkeys held up the same or different arms. Children either said "same" or "different" and the naïve experimenter was instructed to look at the children and pressed the appropriate response button for them. This minimised working memory demands and avoided the known risk of interference between button presses and imagery processes (Kail, 1988; 1991) .
After the test trials, children were asked in which direction the monkey on the table would fall. Only one 4-year-old answered incorrectly that the monkey on the table would fall in the direction of the longer leg. He was excluded from the analysis of the direction of the fall. For congruency of the fall, participants were equally accurate whether the direction of potential fall was congruent or incongruent with the direction of rotation, F(1, 642) = .51, p = .48, ηp² = .01, and this was the case for all age groups as indicated by the non-significant interaction, F(4, 642) = 1.07, p = .37, ηp² = .04 (Table 1) . Furthermore, there was no rotation direction x angle interaction, F(6, 642) = 1.18, p = .31, ηp² = .01.
( 4-year-olds, 25 out of 31 6-year-olds, 14 out of 16 8-year-olds, all 10-year-olds and adults).
However, the same findings emerged when all participants were included, and above chance performance was observed for each of the ages as an overall group (all ps < .001).
Outlier trials for each age group, those greater than twice the median response time per angle, were excluded (4-year-olds: 6.7% of all trials, 6-year-ols: 4.5%; 8-year-olds: 3.3%;
10-year-olds: 2.9%, adults: 1.5%).
0˚ Trials.
To examine the stimulus encoding and comparison time between direction condition (congruent versus incongruent) and across age groups when stimuli were unrotated, mean response times of correctly solved 0˚ trials were submitted to a mixed Linear Model based on maximum likelihood method.
Mean response times decreased with increasing age, F(4, 175) = 60.15, p < .001.
Adults' (M = 117ms) encoding and comparison time was faster (p < .001) than all child age groups (10-year-olds: M = 2018ms; 8-year-olds: M = 2698ms; 6-year-olds: M = 3064ms; 4-year-olds: M = 2984). Ten-year-olds were also faster than all younger age groups (p < .001),
and 8-year-olds were faster than 6-year-ols (p < .05) but did not differ from 4-year-olds (p = .18). The youngest two age groups did not differ (p = .68). Further, participants responded more quickly in congruent trials (when the stimulus on the table appeared falling towards the comparison stimulus) (M = 2184ms) than in incongruent trials (M = 2589ms), F(1, 175) = 14.24, p < .001. However, this effect was due to 6-and 8-year-olds who took longer to respond on incongruent 0˚ trials (p < .001) whereas the remaining age groups showed no interactions.
Discussion
The current aim was to provide novel insights into the conceptual penetrability of children's mental rotation processes. Two main findings emerged. First, 6-year-old children's but not 4-year-olds' response times for rotated stimuli increased linearly with increasing rotation angle, consistent with previous mental rotation research (Estes, 1998; Frick, Ferrera, & Newcombe, 2013; Frick, et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005; Kosslyn et al., 1990; Marmor, 1975) . This suggests that mental images are quasi-pictorial in format at age 6: children preserve spatial relations in their mental images. Four-year-old children did not show this effect, however fewer than half the children this age group performed above chance. Thus, 4-year-olds might have been guessing and not, in fact, mentally rotating. The drop in accuracy with increasing rotation angle supports this supposition and indicates that the task was too difficult for them. Moreover, the remaining sample, once those who performed below chance The second novel key finding is that 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds took longer to rotate stimuli when the direction of rotation of the monkey on the right hand side was incongruent with the potential direction of fall of the monkey on the left hand side. Thus, between 6 and 10 years of age children's mental imagery rotation performance varied with conceptual information concerning the effect of gravity on the monkey on the left. In contrast, adults' response times of rotated stimuli did not differ with the congruency of the potential direction of fall, suggesting no effects of conceptual penetrability on mental rotation.
This pattern of conceptual penetrability is in line with previous research on interference of motor processes on mental rotation (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005) .
Taken together, the findings suggest that mental and motor processes become increasingly differentiated with increasing age. In line with this notion, current findings indicate that 6-toand 10-year-olds,' but not adults,' mental rotation processes are cognitively penetrable.
With increasing age, mental rotation processes not only become increasingly differentiated from motor processes (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005) but also from top-down processes (current findings). This raises the possibility that mental imagery rotation performance in childhood is supported both by sensorimotor processes and by conceptual processes.
However, it should be noted that the current findings examined kinetic mental rotation.;
Further research should investigate whether this also extends to visuo-spatial rotation of objects (see e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1998) . Moreover, including a more balanced gender adult sample might be preferable since there are well documented advantages for males in mental rotation tasks (Collins & Kimura, 1997; Palermo, Iaria, & Guariglia, 2008; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995) that may also elicit differences in cognitive penetrability. (Freyd & Finke, 1984) . The typical effect is that the anticipation of a moving stimulus' end position is exaggerated in direction of the stimuli's anticipated motion (Freyd & Finke, 1984) . Representational momentum for moving stimuli is already present in 2-year-olds (Perry, Smith, & Hockema, 2008) , and the effect is larger in 5-8-year-olds than in adults (Hubbard, Matzenbacher, & Davis, 1999) . For static stimuli the effect of representational momentum is equally pronounced in 8-, 10-year-olds and adults (e.g., remembering a photograph of someone walking as further along) (Futterweit & Beilin, 1994) . Given that the current findings revealed less of an effect in adults and differences between 10-year-olds and adults, the current data do not fit well with a representational momentum explanation.
However, the finding that 6-and 8-year-olds showed different response times for congruent and incongruent trials under no rotation raises the possibility that their congruency effects for rotated stimuli were a result of decreased attention in incongruent trials away from the comparison stimulus, rather than reflecting top-down influences on mental rotation. If so then we would expect lower accuracy in these trials, which was not the case. Rather, findings suggest that at age 6 children's mental images are depictive, as shown by their linear increase in response times with increasing angle, and their imagery mental rotation performance is influenced by conceptual factors. Overall, this indicates an early reliance on the perceptual properties of images, with children spontaneously utilising conceptual information to guide their mental imagery. This finding adds to earlier work by Estes (1998) , who reported that by age 6, children were similar to adults in demonstrating conscious awareness of the process of imaging the rotation path of a visual image. Four-year-olds, by contrast, were poorer at describing the mental process of rotation, thus indicating less metacognitive awareness in the In sum, children's mental imagery rotation performance can be penetrated by topdown knowledge and this effect decreases with age. The developmental approach taken here provides novel insights into the emergence of the effects of top-down knowledge on imagery mental rotation performance and the depictive nature of mental images. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
